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Abstract
It is a worldwide stereotype that Japanese, compared to Americans, are oriented more toward
collectivism. But this stereotypical notion of more collectivism among Japanese, which typically
stems from a view that individualism and collectivism stand at opposite ends of a continuum, has
been filled with dashed empirical findings, especially in a sample of college students. In the
current study, following the view that individualism and collectivism are two separate concepts
rather than one with two extremes, we test and compare both individualistic and collectivistic
tendencies among college students in Japan and the United States. A review of theories and
research on this dimension of cultural variability across the two diverse cultures and the literature
on societal pressure of collectivity and on parents as primary socialization agents of culturally
expected values lead to two hypotheses: 1) Japanese college students tend less toward
individualism than do Americans, and 2) Japanese college students tend less toward collectivism
than do Americans. Analysis of identical survey data from college students in Japan and in the
United States provides strong support for both hypotheses.

Despite modernization, the old images of Japan held by Westerners, and even among
Japanese themselves, persist. One of the most important of these images is that Japanese people
are more collectivistic than Westerners, and especially more so than Americans – a stereotype

based primarily on an abundance of qualitative studies on stronger ‘group-orientation’ among
Japanese than among Americans (e.g. Eisenstadt, 1996; Jansen, 2000; McClain, 2002; Parsons,
1951; Reischauer, 1970; Rosenstone, 1988) and some empirical evidence on lower individualism
in Japan than in the United States (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1984; Hofstede and
Hofstede, 2004).
Despite this research and the long-running assumption that the Japanese must be
understood with reference to this value orientation of individualism versus collectivism, we
argue that this stereotype should be seriously challenged. We question this stereotype in large
part because this orientation at the individual level may be different from, although not always
incompatible with, that at the cultural level (e.g. Matsumoto and Juang, 2004) and because this
stereotype is based on a view that individualism and collectivism are simply opposite ends of the
same value dimension (e.g. Freeman, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 1987, 1994).
During the past 30 years, in cross-cultural psychology and intercultural communication,
much effort has been devoted to ascertaining the validity of this stereotype (for a meta analysis,
see Takano and Osaka, 1999; see also Matsumoto and Juang, 2004). Normally culture, as a
system of knowledge, is believed to influence and guide our behavior by providing us with
‘interpretations of social life, role expectations, common definitions of situations, and social
norms’ (Olsen, 1978: 107; see also Keesing, 1974). Questioning the equation of the most
favorably received cultural-level scores reported by Hofstede (1980) with individual orientation
toward individualism-collectivism (I-C), however, researchers have attempted to find ways to
study this value dimension at the individual level. Different researchers have used different
methodologies. But the majority have concentrated on survey data because they provide the
greatest opportunity to test a wide variety of items from refinements of Hofstede’s (1980)

seminal individualism index. Yet, there is no consistency in stronger collectivism among
Japanese compared to Americans. Especially, when a sample of college students is drawn from
the two countries, the respondents do not seem to represent the predominant cultural I-C
tendency (for a concise summary, see Matsumoto, 2002).
In nearly all the survey research, the focus has been simply on the differences in
individualistic and collectivistic tendencies between Japanese and Americans. Thus, little has
been understood regarding why these differences appear. We contend, however, the explicit
emphases on societal pressure of collectivity and on early childhood socialization, through which
children are reinforced by their parents for the culturally expected values, provide a perspective
for understanding such differences. Beccaria (1963 [1764]) and Bentham (1948 [1780]) indicated
centuries ago that people are rational beings who exercise free will in making decisions as to
what they will do. As a result, the greater pressure for collectivity and conformative behavior in
Japanese society is expected to drive its people into a stronger aversion to collectivism.
Additionally, Matsumoto (2002) noted recently, but offered no evidence, that the parental role as
a moral beacon has been descending rapidly in Japan, and it is possible that Japanese children of
today may be deprived of the opportunity to learn not only an individualistic cultural theme but
also a collectivistic cultural theme. Therefore, the combination of these two factors, as applied to
the individual I-C, seem to suggest that Japanese youth might be not only less individualistic but
also less collectivistic than are Americans, with differences of this still being observed among
young adults and university students.1

AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN JAPAN AND THE
UNITED STATES

Our expectations concerning the differences in individualistic and collectivistic tendencies of
college students in Japan and the United States are grounded primarily in 1) Hofstede’s (1980)
findings on individualistic and collectivistic cultures, 2) the notion of people exercising free will
in making choices as to what they will do, and 3) previous ideas and research on differences in
early childhood socialization across the two cultures, as they pertain to parental role as moral
beacons.
The idea that Japan, in contrast to the United States, is more collectivistic has a long
history. By the late 1800s shortly after the opening of Japan in 1854, some
Western social scientists such as Percival Lowell (1888) were already putting forth the themes of
Japan’s ‘lack of individuality’, ‘collectivist orientation’ and other supposed characteristics which
make the Japanese almost polar opposites of Western civilization (Rosenstone, 1988). The most
widely known statement on this topic no doubt is Ruth Benedict’s (1946) The Chrysanthemum
and the Sword (see also Abegglen, 1958). The idea that Japan tends more toward collectivism,
while the US tends more toward individualism also gained popularity among Japanese scholars
(e.g. Doi, 1971, 1985; Kawasaki, 1969; Nakane, 1970). ‘Individualism’, in this context, means
placing an emphasis on individual identity over group identity, individual needs and rights over
group obligations, and individual pleasure over adherence to group norms (for a discussion of
individualism in the United States, see Bellah et al., 1985). ‘Collectivism’, on the other hand,
grants priority to group identity over individual identity, shared in-group beliefs over unique
individual beliefs, and cooperation with in-group members over maximizing individual outcomes
(see Gudykunst et al., 1996).
In the 1980s, researchers, especially Geert Hofstede (1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1984; see
also Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993) in the field of crosscultural psychology began

developing measures of I-C and using these measures to collect data from diverse cultures (see
also Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1995). In his seminal empirical study of IBM workers around the
world, Hofstede (1980; see also Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004) reported that the United States
scored 91 (ranked the first out of 39 countries) on his individualism index (51 is the average
score), while Japan received a lower score of 46 (ranked the 22nd). Therefore, as the Japanese
economy came to challenge American economic dominance by the 1980s, one key to differing
management styles between Western and Japanese corporations could be found with the more
collectivistic orientation of Japanese employees (for example, see Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1985,
1990; Lincoln et al., 1995).
Since Hofstede’s original formulation and research, others have modified his basic idea.
Hofstede’s scale items were unique to the workplace. And his research, due to a view that I-C is
a bipolar continuum, offers no empirical evidence that Japan is indeed more collectivistic than
the US. In the early 1990s, two measures were developed in the United States, and they have
now dominated the study of I-C across cultures. They are the individual-level equivalent of the
cultural variability dimension of I-C and refer to the degree to which people conceive of
themselves as separate from or connected to others. In the tradition of theory and research on
‘value orientations’ (e.g. Rokeach, 1973), Schwartz (1990, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987,
1990) designed more global measures of I-C as general value orientations. Markus and Kitayama
(1991; see also DeGooyer, 1992) linked the idea to the self-concept literature, distinguishing
between and measuring an ‘independent self-construal’ (i.e. individualism) versus an
‘interdependent self-construal’ (i.e. collectivism). In their research, Gudykunst et al. (1996)
included questionnaire items from refinements of Schwartz’s and Markus and Kitayama’s scales
and found that Japanese, compared to Americans, scored lower on ‘individualistic value

orientation’ and ‘independent self-construal’, while they scored higher on ‘collectivistic value
orientation’ and ‘interdependent self-construal’.
While research on individualism tends to yield theoretically predicted outcomes, the
dustbin of collectivism has been filled with dashed empirical expectations. A recent review of
the literature led Matsumoto and Juang (2004; see also Takano and Osaka, 1999) to conclude
that the data collected by Hofstede (1980) support the theory that Japanese are more collectivistic
than are Americans, but the findings thereafter, especially those from a sample of college
students, tend to be less supportive. More recently, Matsumoto (2002: 53, italics added)
concluded that, ‘the stereotype of [Japanese being more collectivistic than Americans] is simply
not congruent with contemporary Japanese culture and the psychology of the younger
generations’. For example, Matsumoto et al. (1997) uncover evidence for less collectivistic
values among Japanese college students than among Americans. Kim et al. (1996) also find that
Japanese college students have less interdependent and independent self-construals than do
Americans. The test has added importance because, by examining both individualistic and
collectivistic tendencies of Japanese and Americans, Kim et al., pointed out the possibility that
Japanese young adults (i.e. college students) are not only less individualistic but also less
collectivistic than are Americans. If this speculation is correct, according to Kim et al., the
Japanese college students are then labeled as ‘marginal’, as opposed to the Americans as
‘bicultural’.
Currently, studies on I-C in Japan and the United States seem headed toward a common
fate: new measures will be continuously developed and will be applied to narrowly defined
research questions about differences in I-C in the two cultures, before a theoretically sound
explanation(s) of the contradictory findings is ever presented.

We argue that expanding the research on I-C to encompass societal pressure of
collectivity and contemporary parental practices permits a better understanding of the
psychology of younger generations of today beyond the traditional notion of Japanese
collectivism. Beccaria (1963 [1764]) and Bentham (1948 [1780]) noted centuries ago that people
are self-serving and rational beings who exercise free will in making choices. As a result, if
forced to conform, they tend to resist the external power. The theme of rebellion against the
society, parents, and others can be found throughout Japanese literature. Because the pressure on
Japanese people to conform is great, the characters of Soseki Natsume’s novels such as ‘Sore
Kara’ (‘And Then . . .’) ‘K jin’ (‘The Wayfarer’) and ‘Mon’ (‘The Gate’) and those of others’
strike a desired emotion to rebel. Consequently, the greater societal pressure to collectivity and
conformative behavior in the Japanese society should result in a smaller difference in
collectivistic tendency between Japanese and Americans.
Moreover, we argue that the deteriorating role of Japanese parents as those who are the
primary agents to instill the collectivistic values and the interdependent self-construal into their
offspring contributes, at least to some extent, to a smaller difference in collectivism between
Japanese and American youth. Recently, Matsumoto (2002) concurs with this argument as he
presents renewed opposition to the notion of Japanese being more collectivistic than Americans
and suggests new directions for research to consider the role of parents as primary socialization
agents of culturally expected values and self-construals. In today’s Japan, Matsumoto (2002)
argues, more and more Japanese mothers are willing to ignore behavioral problems as long as
their children continue to study and earn good grades. Many fathers, too, are reluctant to correct
their children because they prefer to have pleasant times and feelings with their children during
little time they share. As a result, according to Matsumoto’s argument, the declining parental role

as moral beacons in the Japanese family might lead to impedance of their offspring to acquire not
only individualistic values and an independent self-construal, but also collectivistic values and an
interdependent self-construal that should be predominant in collectivistic nature of Japanese
culture.
Both Japanese and Americans have seconded that a dearth of firm discipline is a key
characteristic of the current Japanese childrearing (e.g. Azuma, 1986; Bacon and Ichikawa, 1988;
Hoffman, 2003). In her cross-cultural study on parenting, Machida (1996; see also Conroy et al.,
1980; Lewis, 1995) finds that Japanese parents, especially mothers, are less inclined than their
American counterparts to give direct instructions on how to talk, think, and behave. Power et al.
(1992) also observe that Japanese mothers are more hesitant to respond to child misconduct with
material and social consequences. Therefore, as the treatment of children appears to be more
tolerated and lenient in terms of socialization for conscience about right and wrong, a stronger
tendency for collectivism among Japanese youth compared to Americans is expected to diminish
over time.
This Japanese approach to child-rearing, in fact, plays a key role in preparing children for
the opportunity structure they will confront as they transition into adulthood. Kerbo and
McKinstry (1998; see also Rohlen, 1983; Sugimoto, 2003; White, 1987; Yamada, 2000) observe
that in Japan, unlike the United States, opportunities for success are channeled into an extremely
tapered selection process with no alternative paths or second chances. Adult outcomes are
determined during a condensed period of a couple days in spring when a person 18 years of age
sits for the examination for entrance into the university system. With the aim of preparing their
children for this examination, along with the lapse of Confucian teachings unlike Korea and
China (e.g. Sengoku, 2000, 2006), Japanese parents are more and more tolerant of and

indifferent to inculcating proper social behavior and moral principles. For the Japanese children,
this results in less likelihood to acquire the culturally expected collectivistic values and
interdependent self-construal, with a latent effect of pushing them into an ‘apathy’ syndrome
typically characterized as ‘mukiryoku’ (lethargic) and ‘mukanshin’ (indifference).
Additionally, we argue that self-development emphasized in highly individualistic
American culture, coupled with the greater societal pressure of collectivity and the lack of
discipline in the Japanese family, provides an interesting insight into a possibility that the
theoretically predicted cultural dif ference might be even reversed in the direction, thereby
producing stronger collectivism among American college students compared to their Japanese
counterparts. At least in the United States, Guisinger and Blatt (1994; see also Kagitcibasi,
1996a, 1996b; Niedenthal and Beike, 1997) suggest, socialization is predicated on selfdevelopment, by which they mean a mature self attainable from two aspects of developments –
the development of a sense of independence and the development of interpersonal relatedness.
These two developmental processes are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they co-vary positively,
with the development of a mature self in one aspect dependent, at least to some extent, on the
development of a mature self in the other. Consequently, the stronger tendency of collectivism
among American youth, compared to Japanese, could result from the socialization of American
children for cooperation and altruism as aspects of self-development equally as important as
independence and autonomy.

HYPOTHESES

The arguments above lead to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Japanese college students tend to have a less individualistic value
orientation and a less independent self-construal than do Americans.
Hypothesis 2: Japanese college students tend to have a less collectivistic value
orientation and a less interdependent self-construal than do Americans.

METHOD
Samples
Data for this research come from a larger cross-cultural study of individualistic and
collectivistic orientation in behaviors in Japan and the United States. The two identical surveys
conducted simultaneously in the two countries allows for more direct comparisons of analysis
and finding without confounding methodological artifacts. In April 2003, identical
questionnaires, but in different languages, were administered to samples of students in a public
university in Japan and a comparable one in the US.2 The US university has a total enrollment
(graduate and undergraduate) of approximately 22,000 and is within the boundaries of a
metropolitan area of about 1.1 million inhabitants that also contains the state’s capital. The
Japanese university has an enrollment of approximately 16,500 students and is located within a
metropolitan area of about 2.2 million inhabitants that contains the prefecture’s capital city.
Thus, both the American and the Japanese universities are in large (but not the largest)
metropolitan areas that include a state/prefecture capital.
The data collection instrument, a self-report survey questionnaire, was initially designed
in English. Through a series of pre-tests, the questionnaire was then translated into Japanese.3
The survey was administered to both the American and the Japanese university students in the

same month of the year (April).4 In the United States, respondents were enrolled in an
Introduction to Sociology course that is taken primarily by freshman and sophomores, few of
whom have yet declared a major and most of whom will not become sociology majors. In Japan,
our respondents were registered in the sophomore level courses in a variety of majors, including
literature, economics, science, engineering, and education.5
A total of 443 Japanese and 505 English questionnaires were distributed to the students in
the Japanese and the US universities, respectively, along with a cover letter indicating that
participation was voluntary and that all responses were anonymous.6 Nine non-Japanese
respondents in the Japanese sample and 136 non-white respondents in the US sample were
eliminated, resulting in 433 Japanese respondents and 369 white Americans.7 In the Japanese
sample 71.1 percent were male, while in the US sample 43.1 percent were male.8 Other potential
differences between the two samples were considered that might need to serve as control
variables. The mean age of the two samples did differ slightly, but significantly, as did the
percent who had lived in single-adult households. So, as described in more detail below, age and
family structure are included as control variables. Although the two samples did not differ in
family socio-economic status, as measured by parental education, it is included in theanalysis.

Measures
Individualistic and Collectivistic Values
One of the most commonly used measures of value orientations is the one developed by
Gudykunst et al. (1996), designed to tap Schwartz’s (1992) conceptualization of values that serve
individualistic and collectivistic interests. Our questionnaire included items and response options
from this study of Japanese and American college students concerning value orientations. To

measure ‘Individualistic Value-Orientation’ and ‘Collectivistic Value- Orientation’, we asked
respondents to indicate, on a seven-point scale, ‘how important each of the following values is as
a guiding principle in your life’. Possible responses ranged from ‘not important at all’ (coded 1)
to ‘extremely important’ (coded 7). The nine items we included that are identified as
‘individualistic’ are: a sense of accomplishment, pleasure, ambitious, capable, imaginative,
independence, intellectual, logical, self-respect. The ten items that we considered to be
‘collectivistic’ are: helpful, obedient, polite, obedience to parents, meeting all obligations,
harmony with others, cooperative with others, a sense of belonging, observing rites and social
rituals, and interdependent with others.
Before creating a single scale for each of the two value orientations from the combined
samples, we assessed the possibility that the dimensionality of value orientation is not the same
in the two countries. In both cases, therefore, the eigenvalues indicated undimensionality, and the
reliability coefficients were nearly identical for individualistic value-orientation (.79 in Japan and
.84 in the United States) and collectivistic value-orientation (.87 in Japan and .90 in the United
States).
These analyses suggest that we can be justified in creating a single scale for each of the
value orientations from the combined samples. The results from the factor analysis of the items
are reported in Table 1. Again, the eigenvalues (see note in table) clearly indicated a singlefactor model of each orientation. 9 Reliability analysis revealed a maximum alpha of .84 with all
nine items in the individualistic value-orientation scale and .90 with all ten items in the
collectivistic value-orientation scale. Thus, each of the value orientations in the analysis that
follows is a sum of z-score transformations of the corresponding items, with a mean of 0 and a

standard deviation of 5.95 for the individualistic value-orientation and 7.19 for the collectivistic
value-orientation.

Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals
One of the most successfully used measures of self-construal is the one developed by
Gudykunst et al. (1996), designed to tap Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) conceptualization of
independent or interdependent self-construals. All items on the independent self-construal scale
clearly represent individuals who are unique and autonomous. All items on the interdependent
self-construal scale, on the other hand, reflect those who are embedded in group relationships.
For our measures of ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and ‘Interdependent Self-Construal’,
respondents were asked to agree or disagree along a four-point scale with 14 items and 11 items,
respectively, drawn from the measures by Gudykunst et al. (1996).10 The response options were
‘strongly disagree’ (coded 1), ‘disagree’ (coded 2), ‘agree’ (coded 3), and ‘strongly agree’
(coded 4). ‘Independent Self- Construal’ included items such as ‘I try not to depend on others’
and ‘I take responsibility for my own actions’. Items for ‘Interdependent Self-Construal’
included items like ‘I consult others before making important decisions’ and ‘I will stay in a
group if it needs me, even if I am not happy with it’.
Again, we considered the possibility that the dimensionality of each of the two selfconstruals is not the same in the two countries. Preliminary analysis, however, suggests the
covariance matrix proved to be similar. The eigenvalues from principal components analyses
within each country strongly suggest one factor, with no obvious differences in patterns of factor
loadings in the onefactor solutions. Cronbach’s alpha for the linear composite of the 14 items for
the independent self-construal is .80 in Japan and .78 in the United States. Somewhat different

conclusions were reached with principal components analyses of the 11 items for the
interdependent self-construal within nations. For both nations, the Scree Tests (Cattell, 1966)
indicate a single factor, and no major differences in factor loadings are obvious between nations.
But the following item has a poor factor discrimination: .371 among the Japanese and .252
among the Americans for ‘My relationships with others are more important to me than my
accomplishments’. Our attempts to improve the one-factor model by deleting specific items
resulted in the elimination of this item. Alpha of the other ten items for the interdependent selfconstrual is .79 in Japan and .82 in the United States.
The results from the factor analysis of the combined American and Japanese samples are
reported in Table 2. A principal components analysis of the combined American and Japanese
samples yielded a single factor (see eigenvalues in Table 2). Cronbach’s alpha for the linear
composite of the 14 items is .83 for ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and maximum when all 14
items are included in the scale. Again, attempts to improve the one-factor model of the
‘Interdependent Self-Construal’ by deleting specific items resulted in the elimination of the same
item. That item has a poor factor discrimination of .299. The eigenvalues and factor loadings are
listed in Table 2. Reliability analysis reveals that Cronbach’s alpha of .836 is maximized with the
other ten items in the scale. Thus, each of the self-construals in the analyses that follow is a sum
of z-score transformations of the corresponding items, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 7.89 for the independent self-construal and 6.35 for the interdependent self-construal.

Culture
Culture – that is, Japanese and American – is the key independent variable. Our hypotheses are
that Japanese college students would score significantly lower on our measures of individualistic

and collectivistic value orientations and independent and interdependent self-construals than
Americans. In the analysis, culture is coded 1 for Japanese respondents and 0 for white
Americans since all respondents with minority status are excluded from the analysis. The
variable Japan has a mean of .54 with a standard deviation of .50.

Control Variables
Gender. In the analysis, gender is coded 0 for females and 1 for males. For the combined
sample, the variable Male had a mean of .58 with a standard deviation of .49.
Age. Both samples had restricted age distributions because of the populations from which
they were drawn. The mean age of the US sample was 19.62 (SD = 1.55), with 91.8 percent
between 18 and 21 years of age. The mean for the Japanese sample was 19.37 (SD = .64), with
99.1 percent between the ages of 18 and 21. The two means were significantly different (p <
.001). The larger standard deviation for the American sample occurred because of six
respondents who were older than traditional college students, with a maximum age of 34 years.
The oldest respondent in the Japanese sample was 23. When the two samples were merged, the
overall skewness of the distribution of age was 4.26. To reduce this skewness, age was truncated
by converting the ages of the six older US students to 23.
Parents’ Education. We wanted to include a measure of family socioeconomic
status as a control variable. The questionnaire included measures of both family income and
parents’ education. As expected, a high percentage of American respondents (10.8 percent) did
not provide an answer to the question about parents’ income. The figure was even higher – 37.5
percent – for Japanese respondents. The greater non-response rate for Japanese probably can be
attributed to their greater reluctance to provide such information and the greater likelihood of not

knowing their parents’ income. Consequently, parents’ education, rather than income, is used as
the indicator of family socio-economic status. Given the greater variety of family forms in Japan
(see below), we chose to simply distinguish between respondents for whom at least one parent
had a Bachelor’s degree or higher and all other respondents. The variable Family Education,
therefore, is a dichotomy coded 1 if at least one parent has a Bachelor’s degree or above. In the
Japanese sample, 66.5 percent of respondents have at least one parent with a Bachelor’s degree,
compared to 68.3 percent of the American respondents. For the combined sample, the variable
Parents’ Education (coded 1 if at least one parent has a Bachelor’s degree or above) had a mean
of .67 with a standard deviation of .47.
Two Adult Home. Because of the possible effects on individualistic and collectivistic
tendencies of being raised in a single-parent family, and because we expected such families to be
less common in Japan, a measure of family structure was included in the analysis. In Japan, 7.6
percent of households with children have a single parent (Statistics Bureau, 2000), compared to
26.7 percent in the United States (US Census, 2001a). Developing a measure of family structure
applicable to both cultures was confounded by the greater prevalence in Japan of certain types of
families – especially three-generation and extended families (Sugimoto, 2003) – that are rarer in
the United States. As a compromise based on these cultural differences, we classified
respondents into two categories – those who were raised by one adult at any time in their lives,
and those who were always raised by two or more adults. The exact question was phrased as
follows: ‘While growing up, how would you describe your household?’ From the various
response categories that were provided, 84.8 percent of the American sample and 95.4 percent of
the Japanese sample were never in a single-adult household. The variable Two Adult Home
(coded 1 for always with two or more adults) had a mean of .91 with a standard deviation of .29.

ANALYSIS
t-tests
Table 3 reports simple comparisons, with no controls, of the Japanese and US samples for the
value-orientation and self-construal measures. As expected, Japanese respondents score lower
than Americans on both measures of individualistic and collectivistic value orientations, and the
difference is significant beyond the .001 level. Likewise, our data reveal lower scores among
Japanese than among Americans on our measures of independent and interdependent selfconstruals. Again, the differences are not only significant but also substantial (p < .001).

Regression Analysis
Not evident yet, however, is whether the cultural differences observed in Table 3 sustain
statistically with controls for the four socio-economic variables. This issue is addressed in the
regression analysis in Table 4 where the two samples were merged (N = 802) with Japan as a
dummy variable (coded 1 for Japanese and 0 for white Americans) and Male, Age, Parents’
Education, and Two Adult Home as the control variables.
Individualistic Values and Independent Self-Construal To examine whether Japanese
college students are oriented less toward individualistic values than Americans, we regressed this
scale on Japan and the four control variables. In Table 4, the significant (p < .001) inverse Beta
of –.482 for Japan reflects the difference, with controls for the other variables, between Japanese
and American respondents in their tendency to have an individualistic value-orientation. The
negative sign indicates that Japanese, as predicted, are less oriented toward such values. A
similar analysis is reported for independent self-construal. As before, when the control variables

are included, the effect for Japanese is significant. The Beta indicating the direct effect for Japan
is –.486 (p < .001), consistent with the predicted inverse relationship, is strong evidence that
Japanese have a less independent self-construal than do Americans. Overall, therefore, Table 4
reveals a strong tendency for the Japanese respondents to be less individualistic than the
Americans even with controls for gender, age, parents’ education, and family structures. For both
measures of individualism, none of the control variables have significant direct effects.

Collectivistic Values and Interdependent Self-Construal To assess whether Japanese
college students are less collectivistic than Americans, we then regressed the two scales of
collectivism on the dummy variable for Japan and the four control variables. Table 4 shows, with
the control variables, that Japanese scored significantly lower on collectivistic values than did
Americans (Beta = –.411, p < .001).
Similar findings are reported for interdependent self-construal. In Table 4, which contains
the four control variables, the effect of being Japanese is substantial and significant beyond the
.001 level. The direct effect (Beta) for Japan is –.436 in the predicted direction, indicating a
strong tendency for the Japanese respondents to have a less interdependent self-construal. Table
4, therefore, provides rather strong support for our second hypothesis that Japanese college
students, compared to Americans, are oriented less toward collectivism.
Again, none of the control variables have significant direct effects. These findings are
intriguing given the work of Gilligan (1982), who indicates that sex is a powerful predictor of
collectivistic and individualistic tendencies in a US sample. But when comparing both tendencies
across cultures, our findings indicate that culture (Japanese versus Americans) has a larger effect
than sex. In fact, it is the only significant predictor in the table.

Additionally, we examined whether the two separate concepts of individualism and
collectivism are inversely related among the Japanese, but positively related among the
Americans. This possibility was considered by computing the partial correlations for each group
of the respondents between the two individualism and collectivism variables, with controls for
age, gender, parents’ education, and family structure.11 Contrary to Hofstede’s (1980)
conceptualization, the partial correlation between ‘Individualistic Value-Orientation’ and
‘Collectivistic Value- Orientation’ is positive (r = .395) and significant (p < .001) in Japan. But
the partial correlation between ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and ‘Interdependent Self-Construal’
is essentially zero – –.049 (p = .156).
In the United States, the findings for the relationship between individualism and
collectivism appear to be consistent with our expectation, but inconsistent with Hofstede’s
conceptualization. The partial correlations of .539 between ‘Individualistic Value-Orientation’
and ‘Collectivistic Value-Orientation’ and .165 between ‘Independent Self-Construal’ and
‘Interdependent Self-Construal’ are positive in the predicted direction, and both values are
significant at the .001 level. The presence of strong positive correlations between individualism
and collectivism is theoretically and methodologically important. Such correlations suggest that
individualism and collectivism are not a bipolar continuum, but they co-vary positively. Those
who are oriented more toward individualism tend to be also oriented more toward collectivism.
And, for the American sample in the current study, this is consistently the case.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The current research has been a challenge to a widespread assumption that Japanese are
more collectivistic than are Americans – an assumption based primarily on a plethora of

qualitative studies on stronger ‘group-orientation’ among Japanese compared to Americans and
some empirical evidence on lower individualism in Japan compared to the United States. To
challenge this assumption, we have conceptualized, in accord with Freeman (1997) and
Kagitcibasi (1987, 1994), that individualism and collectivism are two different concepts rather
than one with two extremes. Then, drawing on the previous cross-cultural research and theories,
we have hypothesized that the Japanese college students tend less toward individualism and
collectivism than do Americans. Our identical survey data collected at the same time and in very
similar settings in Japan and the United States have contained Gudykunst et al.’s (1996)
measures of individualistic and collectivistic value orientations and independent and
interdependent self-construals which have been used successfully in comparative studies of
Americans and Japanese.
Our assertions are modest and generalization must be approached with caution. First, our
sample of the beginning college students has a restricted age distribution, though our respondents
are part of what Japanese scholars call the ‘global generation’ (Sugimoto, 2003). Second, our
sample is over-representative of the highly educated. While all of them are enrolled in college,
the sample is thus not fully representative even of this age group. Third, our analysis, because of
the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society, is restricted to members of the dominant
group in both counties (i.e. Japanese and Caucasians). Accordingly, the lack of variation on age,
education, and ethnicity may have distorted the differences in the self-reported individualistic
and collectivistic tendencies among college students in Japan and the United States.
Despite these shortcomings, evidence in the data supporting our hypotheses is rather
convincing. As noted earlier, the direct effects (Beta) of Japan – with controls for sex, age,
family type, and parents’ education – on both measures of individualism are inverse and

significant (p < .001): –.482 for individualistic values and -.486 for independent self-construal.
These findings support our prediction that Japanese college students tend less toward
individualism than do Americans, and then suggest that the difference is apparent not only
among adult samples (i.e. employees), as observed by Hofstede (1980), but also among a sample
of young adults (i.e. college students) in the two counties. The findings for the cultural
differences in collectivism are also consistent with our prediction. For both measures of
collectivism, the Japanese sample has
a significant (p < .001) inverse effect of –.411 on collectivistic values and –.436 on
interdependent self-construal. These findings, however, can be problematic since they are
contradictory to the traditional stereotype that Japanese, compared to Americans, are more
collectivistic.
In part, we argue, this could be because our measures of collectivism are not as specific
as they might be preferred. Perhaps the Japanese respondents might emphasize different
collectivistic factors, while they scored significantly lower on our general measures of
collectivistic values and interdependent selfconstrual. For one thing, there are ‘unique Japanese’
values and ‘unique US American’ values. It is worth noting, for example, that the concept of
‘enryo’ (‘reserve’ or ‘restraint’), which is a response to a group pressure for conformity (Lebra,
1976), is not readily available in the United States because ‘reserve’ or ‘restraint’ does not fully
capture the pragmatic meaning of ‘enryo’. In the presence of this group pressure, Japanese are
socialized to not only refrain from expressing their personal opinions that go against the
majority, but also decline to state their desires, wishes, and preferences even when asked to state
(Wierzbica, 1991). As the focus of I-C expands to emphasize cultural differences in this value
dimension, the manner in which and the extent to which culturally unique values are apparent

across cultures should, then, become a central concern, much as it has been in the qualitative
study of I-C across cultures.
Additionally, it is possible that the Japanese respondents might be more contextual than
their American counterparts: the Japanese might be more collectivistic in one context but less
collectivistic in another, while they may, in general, be less collectivistic than the Americans.
When considering whether or not to cooperate with groups, Japanese people, for instance, might
consider whether they would suffer socially-imposed punishment should they not cooperate. In
fact, Yamagishi (1988a; see also Yamagishi, 1988b), in his study of a prisoner’s dilemma game,
found that Japanese participants, in the absence of a sanctioning system, were less inclined to
cooperate with the group than were Americans. But, when the opportunity for mutual
sanctioning was available, the percent of Japanese who intend to cooperate increased
substantially by about 30 percentage points (from 44.4 to 74.6 percent), whereas the comparable
figure for the American participants was 19 percentage points (from 56.2 to 75.5 percent). In
their study of hospital employees, Kobayashi et al. (2001; see also Kobayashi and Grasmick,
2002) also reported that Japanese are more likely to comply with group norms (i.e. workplace
rules) because, compared to Americans, they perceive a greater threat of embarrassment (i.e. a
loss of respect from significantothers). Thus, a better measure might involve items which specify
the perceived probabilities that in-group members would detect uncooperative behavior and then
the detection would lead to social sanctions. Perhaps a more refined measure of collectivism
such as this, taking into account the risk of socially imposed punishment, might have produced
results more consistent with the traditional stereotype.
While the measurement issue cannot be overlooked as an explanation for why the
Japanese were significantly less collectivistic than the Americans in our data, there is another

possibility. The past empirical evidence suggesting that Japanese are more collectivistic than
Americans (e.g. Hofstede, 1980) tends to be studies of adult samples, while ours is a sample of
college students. In fact, Kim et al. (1996), in their study of collectivism using a sample of
college students, found that Japanese scored lower on collectivism than did Americans. In that
study, as in ours, Japanese were also less oriented toward individualism. Some have argued that
modern capitalism and participation in the global economy, over time, have made Japan and the
Japanese younger generation less collectivistic and will continuously move them in this direction
(see Bellah, 1985;Hayashi, 1992; Iwao, 1993). While this might be true and might be the longterm trend in Japan, another possibility, as we have argued, is while Japan is more willing to put
its people under pressure to act harmoniously, the importance of collectivism is not as fully
reinforced at home. For some adolescents, this combination of societal pressure and the lack of
parental discipline for such a societal norm could be even the vehicle through which they later
come to rebel against collectivism. Thus, we hope that future research of collectivism, as it
applies to these two cultures, would involve examining whether a higher level of societal
pressure of collectivity and conformative behavior in Japan and the lack of socialization for the
culturally expected themes (i.e. collectivism) in the Japanese family are related to the lower
collectivism among Japanese than among Americans. Then a rather convincing conclusion could
be reached that these two factors intertwined with each other lead to the significant difference in
a collectivistic value orientation and an interdependent self-construal between Japanese and
American youths.
In conclusion, we want to emphasize again that our findings are only a preliminary
examination of the differences in individualistic and collectivistic tendencies among college
students in Japan and the US. First, our samples of college students are not representative of the

general population in the two countries. Thus, our ability to generalize our findings is limited.
Second, because of the racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society, the analysis was
restricted to members of the dominant group in both counties (i.e. Japanese and Caucasians).
Third, our data do not include direct measures of societal pressure of collectivity and parental
discipline. These measures, lacking in the current study, would strengthen the analyses. Fourth,
we focused on Gudykunst et al.’s (1996) general scales of individualism and collectivism and
their relationships to culture. However, future research needs to develop measures of culturally
unique values and contextual values and incorporate them into research on differences in
individualistic and collectivistic tendencies across cultures. Doing so, we hope, will then open
the path for future exploration of a possibility that culture might be seen much more
differentiated.
Finally and more importantly, we would encourage others not to lose sight of the
importance of the distinction between individualism and collectivism. While the cultural
variability of I-C was conceptualized by Hofstede (1980; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004) as a
bipolar continuum, it is not reasonable to view that a culture and its people who are oriented
more toward individualism than others are automatically oriented less toward collectivism. Thus,
we would hope future comparative research to address the kinds of issues noted above and, then,
increase our understanding of differences in individualistic and collectivistic tendencies across
cultures.
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NOTES
1.
College students, we argue, are a logical choice as a sample of respondents in testing
whether individual-level behavior can be fully explained by the cultural-level scores
regarding this dimension of cultural variability (i.e. individualism-collectivism).
Current Japanese college students are part of what Japanese scholars call the ‘global
generation’ (Sugimoto, 2003), to distinguish them from their predecessors – the
wartime generation, postwar generation, and prosperity generation. They tend to
be more pessimistic about the job market. At the same time, they were born in a
period of declining birthrates and tend to have been raised with no or few siblings
and unconditional love from their parents. Therefore, it is likely that they are less
collectivistic than the generations of Japanese who preceded them.
2.

College undergraduate students were chosen as respondents for two reasons. First, we
had easier access to them in both countries than to younger adolescents or to adults.
Second, the Japanese college undergraduate students, as noted above, are part of
what Japanese scholars call the ‘global generation’ (Sugimoto, 2003). We realize, of
course, that people who do not attend college are excluded from our research design
and might be more (or less) individualistic and/or collectivistic than those who do
attend college. But the inclusion of only college students was a constant across the
two samples.

3.

During the four months of preparing the first draft of the questionnaire, the Japanese
Author discussed translation/cultural issues with four kinds of colleagues: those who
were bilingual with Japanese as their native language, those who were bilingual
with English as their native language, those who spoke only Japanese, and those
who spoke only English. Although the draft of the questionnaire was not subjected
to a formal ‘back translation’ (Matsumoto and Juang, 2004), in effect that process
occurred for each questionnaire item as it was being developed in Japanese. The
Japanese author then pre-tested the questionnaire in face-to-face interviews with a
monolingual and a bilingual for whom Japanese was their native language, resulting
in a few minor changes. Finally, the questionnaire was administered to a class of 30
Japanese college students as the last pre-test. No further changes resulted from this
pre-test, suggesting that the Japanese author had successfully completed a version of

the English questionnaire that would be meaningful to Japanese individuals like the
ones eventually selected to be respondents in Japan.
4.

The month of April was crucial to obtain students from both countries at approximately
the same stages of their academic careers. While an academic year begins
in late August or early September in universities in the US, the Japanese academic
year begins in April. Thus, we chose to gather data in April 2003. We expected the
vast majority of US students in the Introduction to Sociology class then would be
nearing the end of their freshman or sophomore year. In fact, 50 percent of the
US respondents were freshmen and another 30 percent were sophomores. In the
Japanese university, we gathered data in courses at the onset of the sophomore year.
Had we chosen freshman level courses in Japan, the students in the Japanese sample,
unlike those in the US sample, would have had hardly any experience as college
students at the time the data were collected. Indeed, 93 percent of the respondents
in the Japanese sample were beginning sophomores.

5.

Japanese students must declare a major before their admission to a university.
In essence, there is no equivalent to an Introduction to Sociology (or any other
subject) course taken by a large number of students outside their major.

6.

Prior to the distribution of the questionnaire, students were informed that
participation in the study was voluntary and both the anonymity of the respondent
and the confidentiality of their responses were guaranteed. The questionnaires were
then distributed to those who agreed to participate in the study.

7.

We had to address the wide discrepancy between Japanese national and American
state universities in racial and ethnic diversity, a discrepancy so wide that ‘minority
group’ status could not be a variable in our analysis. Race/ethnicity is included, at
least as a control, in tests of individualism-collectivism in the United States. We knew
in advance, however, that this would be problematic in our research because of the
racial and ethnic homogeneity of Japan. Whereas 75 percent of the US population is
white (US Census, 2001b), typical estimates are that 95 to 98 percent in the Japanese
population is racially and ethnically Japanese (Kerbo, 2000). According to a recent
assessment (Sugimoto, 2003), only 5.4 million (slightly over 4 percent) of the 126.9
million residents of Japan are classified as members of ‘minority groups’. Had we
included a variable for race/ethnicity, separating minority group members from
others, that variable would have been collinear with the dummy variable for Japan,
possibly masking the effect of Japan, independent of its race/ethnic homogeneity.
Consequently, our plan was to use only the questionnaires completed by Caucasian
students in the US, excluding those who were self-identified minority group
members. Likewise, we would omit from the analysis the few Japanese respondents
who identified themselves as ‘non-Japanese’.

8.

The gender composition of universities in Japan and the US means that the proportion
of males in the Japanese sample will be higher. In the American university only
half (51 percent) of all students were male, a figure typical of state universities in

the United States. In contrast, Japanese national universities are overwhelmingly
male. According to figures from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (Statistics Bureau, 2003), 66 percent of all students enrolled in all
national universities are males. In the particular Japanese university from which
we gathered data, 71 percent of all students enrolled were males. Our two samples
reflect these distributions.
9.

Among the nine factors of individualistic values and the ten factors of collectivistic
values necessary to perfectly reproduce the correlation matrix, 2 of each value
orientation have eigenvalues greater than 1.0. According to the Kaiser Rule for
determining the number of factors, a two-factor solution would be appropriate
(Nunnally, 1967). Both an orthogonal and an oblique rotation of the two factors,
in general, separate each of the two components as distinct factors. However, in a
principal components analysis, the number of factors with eigenvalues greater than
1.0 is, in part, an increasing function of the number of items. With the larger number
of items, the Kaiser Rule are more likely to overestimate the number of significant
factors, and the Scree Discontinuity Test has been proposed as a preferable strategy
for determining the number of factors (Nunnally, 1967). According to the logic of the
Scree Test, the most obvious break in eigenvalues of individualistic and collectivistic
values is the difference of 2.87 and 4.17, respectively, between the first and second
factors, compared to .19 and .25 between the second and third, suggesting that a
onefactor model would be appropriate for each value orientation. However, we would
encourage others to replicate our measures and develop other items, examining their
unidimensionality with various kinds of samples.

10.

We excluded the following work-related items because of the nature of our sample
(i.e. college students): ‘I consult with co-workers on work-related matters’ and ‘I try
to abide by customs and conventions at work’.

11.

Additional analysis not reported here yielded similar findings. The correlations
we found in oblique rotations between individualistic and collectivistic values
were .310 in Japan and .437 in the US. The correlations between independent and
interdependent self-construals were -.018 in Japan and .165 in the US.
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